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UNITED STATES v. ALASKA:
SECTION 10 PERMITS, THE TERRITORIAL SEA,
AND FEDERALISM
Jeffrey W Peters*
I. INTRODUCTION
United States v. Alaska1 represents the latest clash between the
federal government and coastal states for control of valuable resources
located in the submerged lands of the territorial sea. In its decision, the
Supreme Court considered the conflict between a coastal state's right to
jurisdiction over coastal areas under the Submerged Lands Acte (SLA)
and the federal government's power to regulate the construction of new
structures on the shoreline under the Commerce Clause of the Constitu-
tion. History rang true in this latest chapter of the ongoing dispute.
Under international law, a nation may extend its sovereignty twelve
miles from its shoreline? International law also allows a nation to
consider non-natural structures as a part of its "coastline" and move its
seaward limit as if the coastline followed the contour of the structure.4
The city of Nome, Alaska, recently constructed a causeway that extended
into Norton Sound approximately twenty-seven hundred feet. The
United States conditioned construction on Alaska's promise that the
causeway would not affect the location of the boundary marking the
federal/state three-mile limit; the line of demarcation between federal and
Alaskan submerged lands would continue to be measured from Alaska's
natural coastline in the vicinity of the causeway. To achieve this end the
* Defense Attorney, Judge Advocate General Corps, Naval Legal Services Office,
NAS Memphis; J.D. 1993, University of Maine School of Law.
1. 112 S. Ct. 1606 (1992).
2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1988).
3. See Art. 3, United Nations, THE LAW OF THE SEA, Official Text of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea With Annexes and Index, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5
(1983).
4. Id. Art. 11.
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Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), acting for the United States, required
Alaska to abandon all claims to the submerged lands that would result if
the three mile federal/state boundary were to be measured from the end
of the causeway before issuing the necessary federal construction permit.
The Supreme Court upheld the Corps' actions in conditioning the
issuance of the construction permit. The Supreme Court agreed with the
United States that the River and Harbors Appropriation Act of 18991
(RHA) accorded the federal government nearly unlimited discretion to
grant or deny section 10 permits, and it upheld the Corps' requirement
that Alaska waive territorial claims created by the SLA. The Court
ignored Alaska's invitation to examine the question of whether Corps'
regulations could override the congressional mandate of the SLA. In
Alaska's view the Department of the Army implemented administrative
regulations in a manner that took land granted by Congress. The Court,
however, decided the case on the basis of administrative law; examining
only the question of whether the Corps' regulations, which included
review of the effect of the project on the federal/state boundary as a part
of the permitting process, were proper. The Court's decision validated
the Corps' regulations, holding that the Corps could require a waiver of
rights granted by the SLA as a condition to granting a section 10 permit.
This decision, in effect, allows the federal government to hold property
rights to resource-rich submerged lands as ransom for permission to
construct a public causeway.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Nome, Alaska, applied to the Corps for a permit to construct a new
port facility in 1982. Plans called for this facility to extend into Norton
Sound. The Corps issued a public notice and invited comments in
accordance with the Army's public interest review procedures.6 The
Corps, in consultation with the United States Department of the Interior,
concluded that the proposed Nome facility would extend Alaska's legal
coastline seaward of its present location to the detriment of the offshore
property interests of the United States.
The Department of the Interior recommended that the Corps
condition approval of the permit application upon Alaska's executing an
agreement or a quit claim deed preserving the original federal/state
5. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988).
6. See 33 C.F.R. § 325.3 (1993).
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boundary. Alaska conditionally agreed that if the Corps approved
construction of the facility, its legal coastline would not be deemed to be
in any way affected by the construction, maintenance, or operations of
the Nome port facility. However, Alaska reserved the right to void the
waiver of rights if a court determined that the Corps lacked legal
authority to require such a disclaimer before issuing the permit.7
Alaska's disclaimer satisfied the objections of the Department of
Justice and the Department of the Interior to the issuance of the permit
and the Corps issued a statement of findings supporting the issuance of
the permit pursuant to the Department of the Army's public interest
review criteria. The Corps issued a validated permit on July 25, 1984.
The City of Nome, Alaska, subsequently constructed the port facility,
which included a causeway that extended approximately 2700 feet into
Norton Sound.
In 1988 the federal government solicited comments and nominations
for a proposed lease sale for hard-rock minerals, including gold, in the
Norton Sound area.8 Alaska, taking the position that the proposed sale
involved submerged lands subject to the Nome Port Facility project
disclaimer, submitted comments disputing the federal government's claim
to the submerged lands more than three miles from the natural shoreline
but less than three miles from the low-water line of the Nome causeway.
Although the Nome causeway measured only 85 feet in width and 2700
feet in length, it placed approximately 730 acres of submerged lands in
dispute. Alaska subsequently provided notice of its intention to file suit
challenging the Corps' authority to require a waiver of rights to the
7. The Alaska Department of Natural Resources conditional disclaimer stated in
pertinent part:
Subject to paragraph 4 below, the State of Alaska agrees that the coast line and
the boundaries of the State of Alaska are not to be deemed to be in any way
affected by the construction, maintenance, or operations of the Nome port
facility. This document should be construed as a binding disclaimer by the
State of Alaska to the effect that the state does not, and will not, treat the
Nome port development as extending its coast line for purposes of the
Submerged Lands Act, again subject to paragraph 4 below.
Joint Stipulation 3, 30a. U.S. v. Alaska, 112 S.Ct. 1606 (1992). Paragraph 4 provided
that the disclaimer "becomes ineffective and without force and effect" if a court
determines that "the Corps of Engineers does not have the legal authority to require such
a disclaimer before issuing a permit for a project which might affect the coast line."
Joint Stipulation 4, 30a-31a.
8. 53 Fed. Reg. 8134 (1988).
1994]
62 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:59
submerged lands and seeking to quiet title to the disputed belt of
submerged land in Norton Sound.
The United States requested, and was granted leave by the Supreme
Court of the United States, to commence an original jurisdiction action
against Alaska to quiet title to the disputed lands before Alaska filed suit.
The Minerals Management Service published a final leasing notice
soliciting bids, and the United States and Alaska agreed that any
revenues from leasing of the disputed acreage should be placed in escrow
for payment to the United States or Alaska depending upon the outcome
of the action.9 Both parties stipulated to the facts of the case and the
Supreme Court reviewed the controversy strictly as a question of law.
The fundamental question presented by United States v. Alaska was
whether a state's legal coastline for measuring its three nautical mile
boundary is measured from the low-water mark of an artificial structure
that extends into the sea or from the low-water mark of the natural
coastline.' ° Despite the significant backdrop of federal/state boundary
cases and interpretations of the SLA that bear on this question, the
Supreme Court analyzed the controversy primarily as a question of
administrative law. Justice White interpreted the issue of the case to be
whether the Corps possessed sufficient authority under section 10 of the
RHA" to condition the Nome Port Facility federal permit on a waiver of
rights to submerged lands granted to Alaska by the SLA. The Court
concluded that the Corps had sufficient authority to condition a section
10 permit on a waiver of property rights to lands in the territorial sea
and held the waiver valid and binding upon the State of Alaska.
A. The Arguments
The United States relied primarily upon two cases, United States v.
California2 (California I) and United States ex rel. Greathouse v.
Dern. 3 Both cases suggest that the federal government holds unfettered
9. The bidding process closed and no bids were received. However, the action
continued because both parties agreed that a live controversy remained because the
continued disagreement as to the location of the federal-state boundary would affect the
prospect of future lease sales in the area. United States v. Alaska, 112 S. Ct. at 1610
n.4.
10. Id. at 1609.
11. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988).
12. 381 U.S. 139 (1965) (California II).
13. 289 U.S. 352 (1933).
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discretion to withhold permits for coastal construction even when the
disallowance purposely denies title to submerged lands to which the
States would otherwise be entitled under the SLA. Alaska interpreted
California II differently. It argued that California II established a single
coastline for the administration of the SLA and for the conduct of
international relations, and, therefore, that the Corps overstepped its
authority when it required Alaska to waive legitimate rights created by
the SLA. Alaska maintained that the Corps' discretion to issue the
federal permit did not include authority to waive rights granted by
Congress. The Court, however, sided with the federal government and
reviewed the case as a question of whether the federal government may
require states to abandon territorial claims when considering permits for
coastal structures.14
The United States successfully argued that the RHA placed
responsibility to approve the construction of any coastal structure that
could possibly affect navigation that Congress itself had not approved
with the Secretary of the Army (Secretary). 5 The Secretary, however,
was required to consider the recommendation of the Corps. The federal
government maintained that the broad language of the RHA flatly
prohibited the construction of any obstruction in a navigable waterway
that Congress had not authorized nor had been authorized by the
Secretary. 6 The United States asserted that since the statute lacked
14. Justice White stated the sole question presented was "whether the Secretary of
the Army may decline to issue a permit to build an artificial addition to the coastline
unless Alaska agrees that the construction will be deemed not to alter the location of the
federal-state boundary." United States v. Alaska, 112 S. Ct. at 1611.
15. The broad language of § 10 of the RHA provides in pertinent part:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to
the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited;
and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any ...
structures in any ... water of the United States ... except on plans recom-
mended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the
Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter
or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead,
haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge ... unless the work has been
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the
Army prior to beginning the same.
33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988).
16. Sections 7 and 10 of the 1890 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of Sept.
19, 1890 preceded § 10 of the 1899 Act. The original § 10 prohibited creation of any
obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, to the navigable capacity of any waters
within the jurisdiction of the United States. Section 7 made it unlawful to build any
1994]
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criteria to guide the Secretary, it gave him unlimited discretion to grant
or deny a permit for construction of a structure that obstructs a navigable
waterway. It contended that the Corps could conduct a "public interest
review" to determine whether to issue a section 10 permit and that the
final decision to issue a permit was discretionary. Because section 10 of
the RHA does not specify those factors the Secretary should consider
before issuing a permit, it was reasonable for the Secretary to consider
all factors relevant to the public interest in order to ensure a sound and
fully informed exercise of his discretion. The Secretary may properly
consider, as part of his public interest review, the effects of a coastal
structure on the limits of the territorial sea because, the federal
government argued, a structure that alters the coast line may substantially
alter the Nation's international and federal/state boundaries, affecting the
United States' vital national interests in the outer continental shelf. The
United States concluded that section 10 of the RHA conferred broad
authority on the Secretary to regulate placement of structures in coastal
waters. Given that the federal government could have simply denied the
Nome causeway permit, it could also condition the permit on any ground
that advanced the public interest.
Alaska argued that the RHA did not give the federal government the
right to condition a permit on a state's abandonment of territorial claims
created by Congress in the SLA. It asserted that the RHA is primarily
concerned with ensuring safety of navigation, and, therefore, if the
Nome causeway would not obstruct navigation, then a section 10 permit
ought to issue as a matter of right. Moreover, Alaska maintained that
the Corps' regulations governing the issuance of the section 10 permits
under the RHA granted the Secretary too much discretion.
Alaska also asserted that allowing the federal government to force
coastal states to waive SLA rights to submerged lands placed the United
States in the enviable position of "having its cake and eating it too." The
Nome causeway extended the United States' territorial sea and exclusive
economic zone against the claims of other nations under international
law. Alaska contended that in light of the causeway's effect on the
international boundary, it would be unfair for the federal government to
deny the benefit of that extra area given that the State was responsible
for constructing the new coastal feature. Alaska contended that there is
a strong presumption for a "single coast-line" to be used both for
wharf, pier, or structure of any kind outside established harbor-lines without permission
from the Secretary of War. United States v. Alaska, 112 S. Ct. at 1611.
United States v. Alaska
international law purposes and for federal/state boundary questions, and,
further, that California I1P7 required a "single coast-line" approach.
B. The Decision
The Court began by analyzing the language of section 10 of the
RHA, the decisions interpreting it, and the longstanding practices of the
Corps in fulfilling Congress' mandate. They measured these factors
against the landmark administrative law case, Chevron US.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc."8 The Court, relying on United
States e rel. Greathouse v. Dern9 and United States v. Pennsylvania
Industrial Chemical Corp. ,' found that the Secretary's "authority [was]
not confined solely to considerations of navigation in deciding whether
to issue" a section 10 permit.2" After establishing the broad scope of the
RHA, the Court then examined whether the regulations enacted by the
Department of the Army governing the Corps' review of permit
applications violated the discretion afforded by section 10. The Court
found that the Corps' review process did not overstep the discretion
afforded the Secretary and did not usurp Alaska's sovereignty over
submerged lands within three miles of its coastline granted by the SLA.3
The Corps' determination of "whether an artificial addition to the
coastline will increase a State's control over submerged lands to the
detriment of the United States' legitimate interest" was held to be "a
reasonable exercise of agency authority. "' The Court distinguished its
statements in California II that artificial additions to the coastline
expanded seaward sovereignty under international law, noting that in that
case "the Special Master recognized that the United States, through its
control over navigable waters, had power to protect its interests from
17. 381 U.S. 139 (1965).
18. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Chevron). Chevron holds that when reviewing an agen-
cy's construction of a statute, the reviewing court first determines "whether Congress had
directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. at 842-843. Should the statute be
silent or ambiguous on the direct question presented, then the reviewing court must
decide whether the "agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute." Id.
19. 289 U.S. 352 (1933).
20. 411 U.S. 655 (1973).
21. United States v. Alaska, 112 S. Ct. at 1612.
22. Id. at 1615.
23. Id. at 1616.
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encroachment by unwarranted artificial structures, and that the effect of
any future changes could thus be the subject of agreement between the
parties. "24
The Court next considered Alaska's argument that allowing the
Secretary to establish one boundary for international purposes and one
boundary for domestic purposes under the guise of a public interest
review conflicted with California IL Justice White, explaining California
II, wrote that the decision "did not specify a 'goal' of achieving a
'single' coastline," but that the purpose of the decision was to "give the
SLA a 'definiteness and stability.' " The decision noted that boundary
stability is achieved when the Secretary decides whether a state must
disclaim its rights to submerged lands resulting from artificial structures.
Uncertainty and indefiniteness end when the State disclaims sovereignty
over the submerged lands and the three-mile boundary remains
constant.' Justice White concluded that, in light of the above analysis,
the Secretary could consider a project's effects on the federal/state
boundary as a part of the section 10 permit review process.
The Court then turned to Alaska's argument that even if the RHA
authorized the Corps' regulations, the Secretary's actions were inconsis-
tent with those regulations. The decision states that "the regulations
indicate[d] that the Corps may include in its evaluation the 'effects of the
proposed work on the outer continental rights of the United States.' "
The Court found that it is "untenable to maintain that the legitimate
property interests of the United States fall outside the relevant criteria for
a decision that requires the Secretary to determine whether the issuance
of a permit would affect the 'public interest.' " Justice White concluded
that it would be inconsistent with Congressional intent to hold that the
Corps could legitimately prohibit the construction of the Nome port
facility, but deny it the authority to seek the less drastic alternative of
conditioning the permit on Alaska's disclaiming the rights to the
submerged lands.29
24. Id. at 1616 (quoting California 11, 381 U.S. 139, 176, and n.50 (1965)).
25. Id. at 1617.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1618 (quoting 33 C.FR. § 320.4(f) (1993)).
28. Id.
29. Alaska also argued that the Army Corps of Engineers regulations conflict with
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), which held that a coastal
commission could not condition the granting of a construction permit on the landowner's
granting of a public access permit across private land. Alaska looked to language of
United States v. Alaska
Justice Whites opinion concludes with an analysis of Alaska's
argument that the Army's failure to formalize its authority to condition
waivers of sovereignty in the permit issuance procedures violated
administrative procedure. The Court dealt with this argument quickly,
noting that the United States averred that such disclaimers had been
requested on a case-by-case basis since 1970. The Court found that the
Corps' administrative actions in requiring the disclaimer before issuing
the permit were "neither arbitrary nor capricious" and approved the
Corps' procedures.3"
III. THE TRADmON BEHIND THE CONTROVERSY
The issue of ownership of offshore submerged lands first went before
the Supreme Court in 1842. In over thirty decisions between 1842 and
1935, the Court held that title to submerged lands under navigable waters
belonged to the coastal states.31 More recently, title to offshore
submerged lands has been a source of contention between the federal
government and the coastal states. The federal government did not seek
to assert control over these lands until the discovery of offshore oil and
gas. Competition for control of the valuable resources found in near
shore areas has fueled the controversy, with the possibility of substantial
profit from the sale of mineral leases sparking federal interest. In the
past fifty years, the federal government has generally prevailed in these
contests. The battle for control over these lands has been centered on
three issues: ownership of title to the offshore submerged lands,
definition of the federal/state boundary, and definition of the baseline
from which to measure the offshore federal/state boundary.
Nollan stating that "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose
as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but
an 'out-and-out' plan of extortion." Id. at 837. Justice White considered this argument
in a footnote, stating that Nollan "has no applicability in a situation" where the Court is
called upon to evaluate the statutory authority underlying an agency's action. He went
even further to dismiss any influence of Nollan, stating that "[e]ven were the Nollan
situation analogous to that presented here, we note that Alaska would gain no benefit
because the purpose behind imposing a condition for issuance of the permit-to protect
federal rights to submerged lands-is the same as that for denying the permit." United
States v. Alaska, 112 S. Ct. at 1618 n.12 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. at 837 (1987)).
30. Id. at 1619.
31. Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Tidelands Controversy Revisited, 19 ENvTL. L. 209,
212-213 (1989).
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A. Does Title to Offshore Land Lie With
the Federal Government or the States?
The Roosevelt Administration commenced the battle for title to
offshore submerged lands when it promoted federal legislation declaring
that the federal government held title to submerged lands beyond the low
water mark.3" World War II suspended the controversy for a time, but
after the war Congress began to consider legislation that surrendered
federal claims to offshore lands and granted coastal states title to
submerged lands within their historic boundaries.33 The Executive
Branch re-entered the controversy with a Presidential Proclamation' by
President Truman that declared United States' jurisdiction over natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas.35 Executive Order 9033, which implemented the Proclama-
tion, stated, however, that the Proclamation did not affect the fed-
eral/state controversy as it related "to the ownership and control of the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf within or outside of the 3-mile
limit. ,,36
Some coastal states took advantage of President Truman's failure to
address the intragovernmental ownership issue by exercising control of
the submerged lands of the territorial sea themselves. In particular,
California began leasing submerged lands within the three-mile limit for
petroleum exploration. President Truman resorted to litigation in the
Supreme Court when he recognized that Congress would side with
32. In 1938, the Independent Exploration Company sought a contract from the
Department of Interior authorizing petroleum exploration in waters beyond the three-mile
limit. This request brought the question of rights to submerged lands beyond the
territorial limit to the attention of President Roosevelt. President Roosevelt suggested
that the Secretary issue an Executive Order to handle the problem. See Kenneth W.
Swenson, Note, A Stitch in Time: The Continental Shelf, Environmental Ethics and
Federalism, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 851, 858 n.36 (1987).
33. Id.; see also William K. Metcalfe, The Tidelands Controversy, 4 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 39 at 51-64 (1953).
34. This proclamation is identified as "Policy of the United States With Respect to
the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf," Proclamation
No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Comp.) nullified by 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988).
35. Fitzgerald, supra note 31.
36. The Truman Proclamation provided notice of the change in United States policy
in regard to its territorial sea to other nations. The proclamation asserted ownership of
the continental shelf by the United States, but it did not address the important issue of
state versus federal ownership of the area. Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 34.
United States v. Alaska
coastal states.37 Congressional action to return control of offshore
submerged lands to the states indicated to President Truman that he
should not expect Congressional help to place these areas under federal
control. The United States filed suit against California in 1947.38
The United States challenged California's exerted control over
submerged lands located within three miles of its coastline. It sought to
enjoin California from leasing the disputed submerged lands and to
compel accounting of all proceeds from any executed leases. The suit
asked the Supreme Court to decide whether the federal government or a
coastal state held a superior right to take, or authorize the taking of, the
oil and gas found under offshore submerged lands. The United States
asserted that it owned in fee simple, or possessed paramount rights in
and powers over the lands, minerals and other things of value underlying
the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of the low water mark on California's
coast and outside the inland waters of the state.39 California answered
the complaint, asserting ownership of the belt of submerged lands
extending three miles from the low water mark based on the original
boundaries established in California's Constitution. California also
asserted that the equal footing clause of the Enabling Act that admitted
California into the Union granted it the same historical rights possessed
by the original states over their offshore lands.'
The Court rejected the equal footing argument, holding that the
original states never held title to offshore lands beyond the low water
mark.4' When the original states declared independence from England,
there was no claim to, nor international recognition of, a three-mile
territorial sea.42 The federal government established the territorial sea at
a later date for international purposes.43 The Court did recognize state
ownership of submerged lands lying under inland bodies of water under
37. Fitzgerald, supra note 31, at 213-214.
38. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (California 1).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. This Article uses the term territorial sea to refer to that three-mile belt of water
normally claimed by the coastal states. The general use of the term infers no specific
points of measurement of the boundary.
43. California , 332 U.S. at 33 n.16.
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the rationale of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,' but it refused to transfer
similar control of the lands beneath the territorial sea to the coastal
states. The court looked to the international aspect of the territorial sea
and found that the federal government's interest in national defense,
commerce, and international affairs called for paramount rights and
control over this area to rest with the federal government.45 The Court
stated:
if this rationale of the Pollard case is a valid basis for a
conclusion that paramount rights run to the states in inland
waters to the shoreward of the low water mark, the same
rationale leads to the conclusion that national interests, responsi-
bilities, and therefore national rights are paramount in waters
lying to the seaward in the three mile belt.'
The federal government won the first round, but California I" did
not mark the end of state challenges to attempts to exercise control over
the minerals found in the submerged lands of the territorial sea. In
1950, the Supreme Court faced the question of federal versus state
ownership of submerged lands off the coast of Louisiana and Texas.
These states, ignoring the Supreme Court's pronouncement in California
I, continued their activities on the submerged lands found off their
coasts. The federal government brought the controversy into the Gulf of
Mexico with two concurrent cases against Louisiana and Texas, United
States v. Louisiana' and United States v. Texas 49 respectively. Once
again, control of mineral leases provided the catalyst for litigation.
Louisiana asserted that it retained ownership of submerged lands within
three miles of its shore in the Gulf of Mexico, arguing that it owned this
area because since admission into the Union it had "exercised continuous,
44. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). Under the Pollard
Doctrine a state has a qualified ownership of lands under navigable inland waters such
as rivers, harbors and tidelands down to the low water mark. See e.g., Manchester v.
Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1890); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1905); The
Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166 (1912). See also United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189
U.S. 391 (1903); Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
45. California 1, 332 U.S. at 35-36.
46. Id. at 36.
47. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
48. 339 U.S. 699, 702 (1950) (Louisiana 1).
49. 339 U.S. 707, 711 (1950).
United States v. Alaska
undisturbed and unchallenged sovereignty and possession over the
property in question."I' The Court, following California I, dismissed the
State's claims."1
Texas distinguished its argument by asserting that as an independent
nation the Republic of Texas had enjoyed open, adverse, and exclusive
possession of and had exercised jurisdiction over the area in controversy
and that the United States' annexation of Texas preserved these rights. 2
Texas, as an independent republic, exercised sovereignty over a three
marine league territorial sea, exercising both dominium53 and imperium54
over this area.5 Texas claimed that when it entered the Union, it
surrendered only its imperium, not its dominium, over its offshore
lands.16  Furthermore, Texas alleged that Congress recognized Texas'
territorial claim to offshore lands in the resolution of annexation.57
Despite these arguments, in United States v. Texas, the Court rendered
a decision similar to Louisiana I which applied California I and found
against Texas.
The Court offered a novel interpretation of the equal footing clause.58
It found that even though the Republic of Texas may have enjoyed
50. Louisiana 1, 339 U.S. at 702.
51. Id. at 705.
52. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 711.
53. In the civil and old English law, dominium means ownership; property in the
largest sense, including both the right of property and the right of possession or use.
BLACK'S LAW DICroNARY 456 (5th ed. 1979).
54. Imperium means the right to command, which includes the right to employ the
force of the state to enforce the laws. This is one of the principal attributes of the power
of the executive. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 754 (5th ed. 1979).
55. Texas was an independent republic for nine years between 1836 and 1845.
56. Texas argued that in its unique, pre-annexation status as a sovereign republic
it exercised both dominium and imperium over the land, minerals and other products of
the submerged lands under the territorial sea within three miles of its shoreline. In
California I the Court found that California, like the original 13 States never held
dominium over that area. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 712-713.
57. Id. at 710-714.
58. The Court ruled that because upon admission of a state into the Union, title to
submerged inland lands traditionally passed to the state as an incident of the transfer of
local sovereignty to the state, in the converse situation presented by Texas' annexation,
any implied or special limitation of any of the paramount powers of the United States
would be negated. In effect, Texas relinquished some of its soveriegnty when it joined
the Union in order to gain an equal footing with other states and the United States
succeeded Texas in ownership of submerged lands. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
at 717-718.
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paramount rights over its territorial sea, the state of Texas had relin-
quished this control to the federal government. The Court acknowledged
Texas' assertion of imperium and dominium over its offshore lands as a
sovereign nation, but found that when Texas became a state it relin-
quished authority over its offshore lands to the federal government due
to the overriding concerns for national defense and international affairs.
This decision broadened the scope of California I as it held, in effect,
that regardless of past status, Texas, like other coastal states, did not
hold title to submerged lands in the territorial sea because of overriding
international considerations. 9
Even after Supreme Court decisions and an effective presidential
veto that seemed to solidly vest control of the submerged lands of the
territorial sea with the federal government, the controversy remained
alive. While the Supreme Court judicially solidified federal control of
the submerged lands of the territorial sea, Congress worked to counter
the judicial decisions. In 1946 and 1951, Congress legislatively granted
title to these areas to the coastal states, but President Truman vetoed both
bills.' The issue of ownership of offshore submerged lands became an
issue in the 1952 elections. Republicans favored granting title to the
coastal states, while northern and southern Democrats split on the issue.61
The combination of President Eisenhower's victory and Republican
control of Congress provided the proper environment for the enactment
of the Submerged Lands Act in 1953.62 This Act legislatively overruled
California I, Louisiana I, and United States v. Texas, and it gave the
coastal states their first victory in the struggle for control of the
submerged lands of the territorial sea.
The SLA granted coastal states title to the submerged lands of the
territorial sea and the rights to the natural resources contained therein,
and relinquished federal claims to such lands. 3  It bestowed an
unconditional grant to offshore lands within three miles of the coastal
states' coastlines.' 4 Under the SLA the federal government retained the
59. Id. at 718-720.
60. Fitzgerald, supra note 31, at 218.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988).
64. Gulf states could assert a claim of three marine leagues from their coastlines.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1312 (1988).
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right to regulate offshore activities for the purposes of navigation,
national defense, international affairs, and commerce.65
Surprisingly, challenge to the SLA came from two coastal states.'
Alabama and Rhode Island possess only minimal ocean frontage when
compared to other coastal states and, as a result, the SLA decreased their
rights to the territorial sea. Taking the position that the territorial sea
should be shared equally by all coastal states, which would increase their
rights in relations to the other coastal states, they argued "that the
resources under the marginal sea did not, under United States v. Texas,
Louisiana I, and California I, constitute property either of the United
States or of any state."67  They alleged that Congress could not divest
paramount rights since those rights were aspects of sovereignty.
Furthermore, they urged the Court to find that the SLA violated the
equal footing clause because "the rights [were] held in trust for all the
states as a federal responsibility and to cede them to individual states
would take away the 'equal footing' among states by extending state
power into the domain of national responsibility."68
The Supreme Court denied Alabama's and Rhode Island's motions
to file complaints challenging the constitutionality of the SLA. The
Court held that its prior decisions recognized the paramount rights of the
United States in offshore submerged lands, and that these paramount
rights were equivalent to a property right.69 The Court found that
congressional power over public lands was entrusted to Congress without
limitation. Congress could deal with these lands as could a private
owner: the Court could not interfere with Congress' actions with regard
65. 43 U.S.C. § 1314 (1988). Although the federal government granted the coastal
states title to the submerged lands of the territorial sea, it expressly reserved for itself
rights to submerged lands seaward of the territorial waters. Congress passed the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988), soon after it passed the SLA.
This Act granted jurisdiction over submerged lands seaward of the boundaries established
in the SLA to the federal government, and rested broad discretionary authority to
regulate oil and gas development on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) with the
Department of the Interior. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988); see also Warren M.
Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6 STAN. L.
REV. 23 (1953).
66. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
67. Id. at 274 (Reed, J., concurring).
68. Id. citing United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 719, and Coyle v. Oklahoma,
221 U.S. 559 (1910).
69. Id.
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to the public lands.7' Justice Reed stated in his concurrence that
relinquishment of property rights to submerged lands did not interfere
with United States' sovereign interests and Congress could grant property
to some coastal states without awarding the same amount to all coastal
states.71 Although the Court never heard the suit presented by Alabama
and Rhode Island, this decision represented a fundamental change in the
Court's consideration of ownership of submerged lands. The Court
abandoned the international perspective of California !P and its progeny
and termed the controversy over title to the submerged lands of the
territorial sea a domestic dispute over Congressional disposition of
United States property.
Alabama v. Texas73 ended the controversy over possession of title to
submerged lands in the territorial sea.74 This case recognized the SLA
70. Id.
71. Id. at 274-276.
72. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
73. 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
74. A later case, United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975), involved claims by
the original Atlantic seaboard states to offshore lands in the Atlantic Ocean. In 1968,
the State of Maine leased 3.3 million acres located eighty-eight miles offshore for energy
exploration. The United States brought suit against Maine, and the other twelve Atlantic
states, challenging their claims to offshore lands beyond the three-mile territorial sea.
The suit was originally filed against 13 states bordering the Atlantic Ocean-ME, NH,
MA, RI, NY, NJ, DE, MD, VA, NC, SC, GA, and FL. Connecticut was not made a
party to the suit because it borders Long Island Sound, which is considered inland water
rather than open sea. Id. at 517 n.1. The states challenged the previous seaward
boundary cases, asserting that, as grantees of the crown of England, they possessed
exclusive rights of dominion and control over the seabed underlying the atlantic from the
coastline to the limits of United States jurisdiction. Id. at 518.
The Supreme Court, following the rationale of California I, denied the Atlantic
states' claims. Id.; see California 1, 332 U.S. at 38-39. The Court found that the
original colonies never held title to offshore lands beyond the low water mark, and that
the federal government created the first claim of title to such lands when it established
the three-mile territorial sea. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. at 520, 523-524. The
federal government's sovereign interests provided the basis for its paramount rights in
these offshore lands, including the energy resources located therein. The Court held that
the SLA merely relinquished the federal claims to offshore lands three miles from the
Atlantic States' coastlines, and refused to reconsider the rationale of the earlier cases.
1d. at 523-526.
The Court severed Florida's Atlantic boundary claim from United State v. Maine
because Florida's claim rested on different grounds. 420 U.S. at 517-518 n.3 (1975).
Florida asserted that its 1868 Constitution established its Atlantic boundary, and that
Congress accepted this boundary when it accepted the Florida Constitution. Affirming
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as controlling the ownership question. The SLA firmly placed control
over these areas with the coastal states. This decision, however, is also
important for the change in direction taken by the Court. The Court
abandoned its previous rationale of viewing the issue as a matter of
international concerns in favor of viewing it as a domestic dispute
between the federal government and the states. Previous decisions turned
in favor of the United States because of concerns over national defense,
commerce, and international affairs. The removal of these issues from
consideration and the recognition of Congressional discretion clearly
favored the coastal states and ended the dispute over ownership of the
title to the submerged lands of the territorial sea.
B. Locating the Federal/State Offshore Boundary
Defining the offshore federal/state boundary was nearly as important
as the question of title. In 1956, both the United States and Louisiana
attempted to lease the same tracts of submerged lands. The dispute arose
because Louisiana measured its boundary at three marine leagues and the
federal government measured the boundary at three miles. The United
States challenged Louisiana's claim of ownership, and the Supreme Court
enjoined all leasing in the disputed area.75 Continuing the action, the
Supreme Court granted leave to the other Gulf states to join the suit. 6
the Special Master's Report which held that prior to the SLA, the federal government
possessed paramount rights over submerged offshore lands, the Supreme Court held that
the SLA established Florida's only claim to offshore Atlantic lands. See United States
v. Florida, 425 U.S. 791, 792 (1975).
Florida claimed that the Straits of Florida and the Florida Keys were in the Gulf of
Mexico, not in the Atlantic Ocean. The Supreme Court rejected this claim and limited
Florida's claim to three miles, not three leagues. Id. at 792-793. The Court, continuing
Louisiana H, 363 U.S. 1 (1960), also established Florida's boundary in the Gulf of
Mexico. The Court affirmed the Special Master's Report that invoked United States v.
Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155 (1967) (Louisiana 1) and United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S.
1 (1969) (Louisiana M), and held that Florida's Gulf coastline must be measured from
its 1868 coastline if accretion occurred, or from its present coastline if erosion occurred.
United States v. Florida, 425 U.S. at 792-793. Florida also asserted that Florida Bay
satisfied the definition of a historic bay for the purpose of measuring its three league
grant in the Gulf. The Court upheld the Special Master's Report that found that Florida
did not meet the criteria for establishing an historic bay. Id.
75. United States v. Louisiana, 351 U.S. 978 (1956) (per curiam).
76. United States v. Louisiana, 354 U.S. 515 (1957). The Supreme Court granted
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi and Texas leave to join the suit.
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In the resulting action with the combined Gulf states, the United
States argued that a state boundary cannot be greater than the national
boundary, and since the national boundary was never greater than three
miles from shore, no state boundary could extend beyond three miles
from shore.7 The states countered with a segmented argument that the
SLA ipso facto made a three league grant to all Gulf states, or at least
established the boundary of Texas and Florida at three leagues.
Alternatively, the states argued for boundaries established prior to
admission to the Union and that the national boundary at the time of
admission was irrelevant because the SLA demonstrated Congressional
intent for the coastal states to receive title to their historical territories.
And finally, if the national boundary were deemed relevant, then the
boundary should be established at three leagues because it had always
been three leagues in the Gulf of Mexico.7"
The Court interpreted the sole question presented in Louisiana H to
be "only the geographic extent to which the statute [SLA] ceded to the
States the Federal rights established" in previous decisions.79 The Court,
following the rationale of Alabama v. Tas,' characterized the
controversy as a "wholly domestic concern within the power of Congress
to resolve, '"81 and concluded that Congress could recognize different
boundaries for different circumstances. It determined that Gulf states
could claim ownership of submerged lands within three marine leagues
of their coastlines if they met both prongs of a two-part test: (1) state
boundaries had to exceed three miles upon admission into the Union and
be legally effective under the Pollard doctrine,' and (2) Congress had
to approve the boundaries. 3
The Court found that Texas claimed a three league boundary as an
independent republic and that its annexation resolution confirmed that
boundary. These actions entitled Texas to a three league boundary for
domestic purposes.' Florida was also entitled to a three league
boundary in the Gulf because its constitution defined such a boundary
and Congress accepted the Florida Constitution when it readmitted
77. 363 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1960) (Louisiana II).
78. Id. at 12.
79. Id. at 7.
80. 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
81. Louisiana II, 363 U.S. 1, 31 (1960).
82. See supra note 44.
83. Louisiana II, 363 U.S. at 27, 33-36.
84. Id. at 36-65.
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Florida into the Union in 1868.' The Court rejected the boundary
claims of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, but acknowledged their
title to offshore islands beyond the United States territorial limit. 6
Although not all states won their claims, the location of the federal/state
boundary in the territorial sea was clearly found to be within the
discretion of Congress.
Controversy over the location of the federal/state offshore boundary
reinforced the rationale of Alabama v. Texas. The Court abandoned its
focus on international concerns to view the controversy as a domestic
boundary dispute. Louisiana II indicated that the states were making
headway in favor of federalism in the territorial sea. However, in future
cases the Court returned to the international law perspective which
favored the federal government.
C. Defining the Baseline from Which to Measure
the Offshore Federal/State Boundary
Although Supreme Court involvement in the dispute over ownership
of submerged lands dated to World War II, the term "boundary"
remained undefined until 1988. Under the SLA, a state measured its
three-mile seaward boundary from the "coastline."'  The "coastline"
generally follows the "line of ordinary low water,"88 and waters inside
the "coastline" are inland waters. In Congressional deliberations during
consideration of the SLA, it became clear that agreement on a definition
of "inland waters" was likely to impede passage of the legislation
because no agreement could be readily reached concerning where to draw
the "coastline" across bays and rivers. 9 When Congress finally enacted
the SLA it neither accepted nor rejected any rule or formula for
addressing the problem, and left the defintion of "inland waters" to the
judiciary.' Congress granted control of submerged lands beneath the
85. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121, 121-129 (1960).
86. Id.
87. Florida and Texas have historic boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico extending
three marine leagues (nine geographic miles) from their coastlines. See Louisiana 11, 363
U.S. 1 (1960). Florida, on its Atlantic Ocean side, has a statutory three-mile seaward
boundary.
88. See 43 U.S.C. 1301(c) (1989).
89. See California 1I, 381 U.S. 139, 152 (1965).
90. See id. at 150-152, 157, 164.
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territorial sea to the coastal states with the SLA, but it failed to define
the key term necessary to exercising these newly created rights.
The need for a precise manner to determine the exact location of the
federal/state boundary set the stage for California II.9' California
claimed its coastline began at the end of the inland waters identified as
"those waters which the State considered to be inland at the time it
entered the Union. "I The United States challenged California's claim,
alleging that California's coastline should be set at three miles beyond the
baseline established in California LI The controversy centered upon
defining the term "inland waters" because Congress neglected to do so
in the SLA.94 This decision reinvoked the international law and policy
considerations of California 19' as the Court turned to international law
to define "inland waters."
The Supreme Court decided that because the SLA contained no
definition for inland waters, Congress intended the term to be defined by
the courts.96 The Court looked to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone (Convention)97 to define the SLA's "inland
waters." 98  The United States ratified the Convention in 1964. This
established the method for delineating seaward territorial boundaries of
the signatory countries. Under this convention, a country's territorial sea
boundary is measured from a "baseline" that, like the SLA's "coastline,"
generally follows the line of ordinary low water. The Convention also
recognized the ambulatory nature of a country's territorial sea, and
91. The SLA halted the California line of proceedings. Because of the depth of
water off California's shores, the current technology allowed for drilling only close to
shore and the Court did not take action on the Special Master's Report, allowing the
California controversy to lie dormant. By 1963, technology made deep water drilling
economically feasible and the United States filed an amended complaint reviving the
controversy. Id. at 148-149 (1965).
92. Id. at 149.
93. The Court established the low water mark as the baseline in California I. Id.
at 149-150.
94. The original version of the bill defined inland waters as "all estuaries, ports,
harbors, bays, channels, straits, historic bays, and sounds, and all other bodies of water
which join the open sea." However, Congress deleted this definition from the final
version of the bill that became the Submerged Lands Act. Id. at 150-152.
95. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
96. California II, 381 U.S. at 150-161.
97. Geneva Conventions of 1958, Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone [Convention], April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
98. California II, 381 U.S. at 161-167.
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established that the boundary may be modified by natural changes in and
artificial accretion to the coastline.9 The Court adopted the Conven-
tion's definition for the SLA with the goal of establishing "a single
coastline for both the administration of the SLA and the conduct of our
future international relations."1" It supported California's position and
recognized juridical bays and historic bays as inland waters,"'1 but denied
the use of straight baselines to establish California's inland waters,"°
99. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29,
1958, pt. 1, art. 8, 15 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. 5639 The Supreme Court has held that
the ambulatory nature of boundaries as allowed by the Convention applies equally to the
delineation of State seaward boundaries. See California I, 381 U.S. at 177; United
States v. California, 432 U.S. 40, 41 (1977) (Second Supplemental Decree). Louisiana
If, 389 U.S. at 158; and United States v. California, 447 U.S. 1 (1980) (California I1).
100. California H, 381 U.S. at 165.
101. Article 7 of the Convention states:
1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single
State.
2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation
whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain
landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An
indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large
as, or larger than, that of a semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across
the mouth of that indentation.
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that
lying between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a
line joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because
of the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-
circle shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the
lines across the different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included
as if they were part of the water areas of the indentation.
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance
points of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn
between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be
considered as internal waters.
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entran-
ce points of the bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-
four miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the
maximum area of water that is possible with a line of that length.
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays,
or in any case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is
applied.
Convention, quoted in California H, 381 U.S. at 169 n.36.
102. Id. at 167-169.
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even though the Convention established inland waters with straight
baselines drawn from the mainland around offshore islands."°3
After California H, Louisiana and Texas attempted to apply the
Convention to their ongoing disputes over the territorial sea in the Gulf
of Mexico." In Louisiana III, a continuation of Louisiana II, 1' Texas
invoked an article of the Convention which included artificial structures
as part of the shoreline,"° and claimed that its three-marine-league
boundary should be measured from the offshore jetties that were
constructed after its 1845 admission into the Union."°7 The United States
argued that the boundary should be measured from the annexation
coastline.108
The Supreme Court held that Texas' three-marine-league boundary
should be measured from the Texas coastline "as it existed" in 1845;
however, if Texas claimed a three-mile boundary, then the jetties would
103. Article 4 of the Convention provides:
1. In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or if
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method
of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within
the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to
the regime of internal waters.
3. Baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless
lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have
been built on them.
4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under the provi-
sions of paragraph 1, account may be taken, in determining particular
baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality
and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
5. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such
a manner as to cut off from the high seas the territorial sea of another State.
6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight baselines on charts, to
which due publicity must be given.
Convention, quoted in California II, 381 U.S. at 167-168 n.34.
104. United States v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155 (1967) (Louisiana III).
105. 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
106. Louisiana III, 389 U.S. at 158. Article 8 of the Convention states, "For the
purpose of delimiting the territorial seas, the outermost permanent harbour works which
form an integral part of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of the
coast." Id.
107. Id. at 157.
108. Id.
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establish its coastline."°  The Court, distinguishing the unconditional
three-mile grant and historical grant provisions of the SLA, stated that
the three-mile grant of California 11110 was not tied to a specific boundary
at a specific date, but the three-league grant was specifically tied to
Texas's entry into the Union."' It determined that using the Convention
to define the Texas coastline would grant Texas title to offshore land that
Congress never intended. The Court retreated from the international law
rationale of California II and refused to allow Texas to combine
international law and federal law to "carve out the largest possible area
for itself. '112
In Louisiana HI, the Supreme Court held that Texas's three-league
seaward boundary must be measured from its coastline as it existed in
1845."1 In Louisiana IV, the Court established from what point on the
Texas shoreline the boundary should be measured.14 The United States
argued for the boundary to be measured from the modern coastline.
Texas argued that the 1845 coastline should be used because erosion and
accretion unfairly decreased the three league boundary."5 The Court,
returning to an international law source, adopted the Convention's
principle of an ambulatory coastline, and determined that Texas' three
marine league boundary should be measured from the present
coastline." 6 This directly conflicted with Louisiana III which required
the 1845 coastline be used in such measurements." 7 Consequently, if
there was any accretion to the Texas coast since 1845, the three league
boundary was measured from the 1845 coastline. If there was any
erosion, the boundary was measured from the modern coastline as
defined by the Convention."' The Court acknowledged the paradox
109. Id. at 160.
110. See 381 U.S. at 155.
111. Louisiana 1L, 389 U.S. at 183-184.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 160.
114. Louisiana IV, 394 U.S. 1 (1969).
115. Id. at 3-4. Erosion had claimed between 17,000-35,000 acres along the Texas
coast. Much of the present coastline of Texas is inland from its 1845 coastline. Id. at
4 n.4.
116. Id. at 4-5.
117. 389 U.S. at 161.
118. Louisiana IV, 394 U.S. at 5-6.
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created by its decision, but attributed the inequity to the SLA and left
Texas to turn to Congress for relief.119
Boundary problems persisted in the Gulf of Mexico even after
Louisiana IV, with the previous decisions only compounding the
ataxia.1" In Louisiana V, Louisiana asserted that its boundary should be
measured from the Inland Water Line, fixed by the Coast Guard pursuant
to an 1895 federal statute.' 1 The United States challenged Louisiana's
claims, arguing that the definition of "inland waters" found in the
Convention should determine the baseline.
The Supreme Court found that Congress intended the 1895 statute to
divide federal/state jurisdiction for the purpose of navigation, and that
Congress designed the SLA to distinguish federal/state claims of
ownership but did not intend to define "inland waters" in the 1895
statute." The Court held that under the SLA the seaward limit of
Louisiana's coastline is to be defined in accordance with the
Convention." The Court referred the question to a Special Master, who
was to consider Louisiana's claim to historic waters "as if it were being
made by the national sovereign and opposed by another nation. "'24 Once
again the Court demonstrated its propensity towards viewing territorial
sea issues from an international law perspective, with the associated
emphasis upon national considerations.
Defining the baseline from which to measure the offshore fed-
eral/state boundary remains confusing even after these decisions.
However, these cases show that the Court favors resolution of claims of
ownership of submerged lands of the territorial sea from an international
perspective, which implicitly favors the Federal Government's claims.
This approach seemingly conflicts with the principles developed in
Alabama v. Texas 5 and Louisiana Ii15 which characterized this issue as
a domestic dispute between the federal government and the states.
119. Id. at6.
120. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 17 (1969) (Louisiana 9.
121. Id. at 18-19. Louisiana also claimed several historic bays as inland waters.
Id. at 74-78.
122. Id. at 19.
123. Id. at 17-35.
124. Id. at 77.
125. 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
126. 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
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IV. UNE STA= V. A.SKu 4
A. The Administrative Law Perspective
The Court treated United States v. Alaska'27 as presenting only a
question of administrative law.1" However, this case did not solely pose
an administrative law question. The import of this case goes beyond the
legality of the regulations followed by the Corps in its administration of
the permitting process. As was previously discussed, title to submerged
lands in the territorial sea clearly rests with the coastal states as provided
in the SLA. However, locating the offshore federal/state boundary is not
so clear-cut. This case asked the Court to recognize a single boundary
for domestic and international purposes, but the Court declined to do so.
Administrative law provided an answer, but it allowed the Court to
ignore the opportunity to unify and simplify the previous decisions
bearing on the issue.
In its administrative law analysis, the Court correctly began with the
language of the statute which granted the Corps authority over the
permitting process. When a court reviews an agency's construction of
a statute, the court must first inquire "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. "29 If the statute "is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute. "3I The language of section 10 of the RHA, '3 flatly
prohibiting "the creation of any obstruction" to navigation not approved
by Congress nor recommended by the Secretary, is quite broad."
Section 10 does not confine the Secretary to considering only those
factors that bear upon the navigable capacity of the waters involved. Nor
does section 10 condition the right to obtain a permit for construction or
fill in covered waters such that the Secretary may deny a permit only
upon finding an adverse impact on navigation or the presence of other
specified factors. Additionally, statutory antecedents to the RHA provide
no insight into Congressional intent for the statute. Thus, under
127. 112 S. Ct. 1606 (1992).
128. See supra note 14.
129. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (1984).
130. Id. at 843.
131. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988).
132. United States v. Alaska, 112 S. Ct. at 1611 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 403).
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Chevron, the initial question in determining the legality of the Secretary's
actions is whether the Secretary's use of a "public interest review," as
required by Army regulations,'33 "is based on a permissible construction
of the statute. "34
Construction of the RHA has been the focus of few court battles, and
there have been relatively few occasions to decide whether the language
of the statute should be construed broadly or narrowly.Y3 5  Analysis of
judicial interpretations of other sections of the RHA facilitates determin-
ing the permissibility of the Secretary's broad construction of section 10.
Section 13 of the RHA,'36 which was enacted contemporaneously with
section 10, provided that the Secretary "may permit" the discharge of
"refuse" whenever "in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage
and navigation will not be injured thereby." 137  United States v.
Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.138 asked whether section 13
required the Secretary to allow such discharges when they failed to affect
navigation. The Court, interpreting the language of section 13 broadly,
held that even when the Corps concedes that a certain deposit will not
cause injury to an anchorage or navigation, "the Secretary need not
necessarily permit the deposit, for the proviso makes the Secretary's
authority discretionary-i.e., it provides that the Secretary 'may permit'
the deposit. "13 In United States v. Alaska the Court correctly concluded
133. 33 C.F.R. 320.4(f (1993).
134. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
135. See, e.g., United States ex reL Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 353-355,
358-359, (1933) (Petitioners sought permission from the Secretary to build a wharf on
the Potomac River. The Secretary refused to authorize construction solely on the ground
that it would be inimical to the establishment of the proposed George Washington
Parkway. The Court noted that the duty of the Secretary under the statute is not plain
and certain, since the words forbidding all structures in any navigable water, except as
recommended by the Army Corps of Engineers and approved by the Secretary of War,
are only permissive, not mandatory, and there is no plain implication of a duty on the
part of the Secretary to authorize a structure that infringes the rights or obstructs the
public policy of the United States as owner and sovereign of the river bed); United States
v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491 (1960) (concluding that "[t]he philosophy
of the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342,
that 'A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure,' forbids a narrow, cramped
reading either of § 13 or of § 10" of the 1899 Act); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S.
336 (1931); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988).
137. Id.
138. 411 U.S. 655 (1973).
139. Id. at 662.
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that as section 10 provides no criteria to be considered before granting
the permit, the Secretary may apply full discretion in the approval of a
section 10 permit request.
Under Chevron, if the language of a statute does not address the
question presented the court looks to the reasonableness of the agency's
interpretation.110 The courts must defer to the agency's interpretation if
it is reasonable, even though the court may prefer a different interpreta-
tion.141 In 1968, the Corps regulations pertaining to navigable waters
were revised to include consideration of "the effects of permitted
activities on the public interest including effects upon water quality,
recreation, fish and wildlife, pollution, our natural resources, as well as
the effects on navigation" as a part of the permit review process. 42 A
year later, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969,143 requiring federal agencies to consider ecological factors when
their activities may significantly affect the environment. The House
Committee on Government Operations concluded in 1970 that the Corps
was not interpreting its section 10 authority broadly enough.'" The
Committee commended the Corps because the revised regulations
demonstrated that it recognized "its broader responsibilities" pursuant to
section 10, but also instructed the Corps to increase emphasis on how
projects would affect all aspects of the public interest, including
conservation of natural resources, fish and wildlife, air and water quality,
aesthetics, scenic view, historic sites, ecology, and other public interest
aspects of the waterway. 45 This Congressional endorsement supported
the conclusion that the Corps regulations, if anything, did not go far
enough in considering public interest issues, and that Congress desired
the Corps to consider a full range of factors in the permitting process.
The Secretary's public interest review regulations expressly provided
for consideration of a wide variety of factors.'" The Alaska case arises
140. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
141. Id. at 843-844.
142. 33 C.F.R. 320.4 (1993).
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347 (1989).
144. See, H.R. REP. No. 917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 5-6 (1970).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b) (wetlands); 33 C.FR. § 320.4(c) (fish and wildlife)
(1993); 33 C.FR. § 320.4(d) (water quality) (1992); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(e) (historic,
cultural, scenic, and recreational values) (1993); 33 C.ER. § 320.4(g) (property
ownership) (1993); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(h) (coastal zones) (1993); 33 C.FR. § 320.4(i)
(marine sanctuaries) (1993); 33 C.F.R. § 320.40) (other federal, state, or local
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from the consideration of one particular factor-the effects of the
proposed construction on the "limits of the territorial sea. "47 The Corps
regulations satisfied Chevron, but the broad language of the statute did
not speak to the precise question of what criteria the Corps must review
in the permitting process. The Supreme Court's review of this case as
a strictly administrative law question limited its analysis. As a question
of administrative law, the Court could inquire only into whether the
statute spoke to the precise issue presented. Upon finding that it did not,
the Court could consider only whether the agency interpretation was
reasonable, without regard for the appropriateness of the action.
Looking to the judicial, legislative, and administrative history of the
regulations there can be little doubt that the Corps regulations repre-
sented a reasonable construction of the Congressional authority granted
by the RHA, and therefore, the Court concluded correctly that the Corps
validly requested a waiver prior to approving Nome's section 10 permit.
The tenets of administrative law tied the Court's hands in United
States v. Alaska once the Court chose to rely on administrative law to
resolve the case. However, the history of the controversy surrounding
the federal/state boundary in the territorial sea suggests that the Federal
Government would have won this suit even if it were not for the favor-
able administrative law posture of the case. This case ultimately falls in
line with California I"4 and its progeny which seem to guarantee that the
Federal Government always prevails when it comes to valuable offshore
resources.
B. The Three Nautical Mile Federal/State Boundary
1. What The Submerged Lands Act Grants Coastal States
Congress has not exercised its authority to prevent coastal states
from unilaterally extending their coastline or seaward boundaries through
either the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Clean Water Act or the Ocean
requirements) (1993); 33 C.FR. § 320.4(k) (safety of impoundment structures) (1993);
33 C.FR. § 320.4(1) (floodplain management) (1993); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(m) (water
supply and conservation) (1993); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(n) (energy conservation and
development) (1993); 33 C.RR. § 320.4(o) (navigation) (1993); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(p)
(environmental benefits) (1993); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(q) (economics) (1993); 33 C.F.R.
§ 320.4(r) (mitigation) (1993).
147. 33 C.ER. § 320.4(f) (1993).
148. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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Dumping Act. Congress has spoken on this subject only in the Submerg-
ed Lands Act (SLA) which expressly grants States "title to, and owner-
ship of" the submerged lands three geographic miles from the coastline,
while expressly reserving to the federal government certain paramount
rights of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international
affairs. 49 Federal/state seaward boundary disputes are to be addressed
by the Secretary of the Interior, not the Army.150
The SLA grants States "title to and ownership of the lands beneath
navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States." 51 The
Act generally defines the "seaward boundary" of each State "as a line
three geographical miles distant from its coastline."5 ' It defines the
"coastline" as "the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the
coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking
the seaward limit of inland waters."'513 Congress clearly recognized that
the coastline would be constantly modified and changed by human
actions when it passed the SLA. "Apart from the resources which may
be taken from submerged lands, the States have other interests in the use
of such lands. Many piers, docks, wharves, jetties, sea walls, pipe lines,
sewage-disposal systems, acres of reclaimed land and filled-in beaches,
etc. have been established, and many more will be established on these
lands." " 4  Congress was also aware that natural changes constantly
reformed the coastline. 5 The Supreme Court has recognized that
problems may arise due to the ambulatory nature of a State's coastline,
from either natural or artificial causes. But, as the Court has noted, "if
the inconvenience of an ambulatory coastline proves to be substantial,
there is nothing which would obstruct resolution of the problems through
appropriate legislation or agreement between the parties."156 The word
"agreement" implies negotiation; however, the Corps simply gave Nome
a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposition. The Corps told Alaska either to waive
rights created by the SLA, or forgo the permit and the causeway. This
149. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1312, 1314 (1988).
150. See 43 U.S.C. 1336 (1988).
151. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988).
152. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1988).
153. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1988).
154. H. REP. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948), reprinted in 1953
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1415, 1436.
155. Id. at 1424.
156. Louisiana IV, 394 U.S. 11, 34 (1969).
19941
88 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:59
approach is not negotiating an agreement, it is holding the permit hostage
until the "disclaimer-of-rights" is executed.
The SLA is silent as to whether artificial modifications of the
coastline change the seaward boundary of a state. However, under the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the SLA, the three-mile seaward
boundary must be measured from the baseline drawn along points on the
low tide line of the state's coast. This baseline, according to the Court,
is drawn along the mean low tide line of the coastline as it has been
changed and modified by both natural and man-made forces."s  This
construction recognizes the desirability of a "single coastline for both the
administration of the SLA and the conduct of our future international
relations. ""8
The line of cases clearly stands for the proposition that the Nome
facility extended Alaska's coastline under the law. The fact that the
Corps requested the waiver manifests this point. The Court did not
dispute this conclusion when it discussed Alaska's SLA argument. The
Court instead looked back to section 10 of the RHA, and reiterated its
argument that section 10 allows the Corps complete authority to grant the
permit, and, therefore, grants discretion to condition the permit, even
when the condition represents a departure from case law.
The Court's reliance upon administrative law to approve the Corps'
actions in denying the permit in the face of case law is the major incon-
sistency in the opinion. After concluding that California II establishes
that non-natural structures extend the coastline, the Court stated:
The Secretary is making no effort to alter the existing rights of
a State to sovereignty over submerged lands within three miles
of the coastline. The SLA makes this guarantee and nothing in
the Corps' practice, as exercised in this case, alters this right.
What the Corps is doing, and what we find a reasonable exercise
of agency authority, is to determine whether an artificial addi-
tion to the coastline will increase the State's control over sub-
157. California II, 381 U.S. 139, 177 (1965) ("when a State extends its land do-
main by pushing back the sea ... its sovereignty should extend to the new land, as was
generally thought to be the case prior to the 1947 California opinion"); Louisiana L/, 389
U.S. 155, 158 (1967) ("it is clear that in the case of the three-mile unconditional grant
artificial jetties are a part of the coastline for measurement purposes"). See also United
States v. California, 432 U.S. 40, 41-42 (1977).
158. California 11, 381 U.S. at 165; Louisiana IV, 394 U.S. 11, 34 (1969).
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merged lands to the detriment of the United States' legitimate
interests. 1 59
This clearly runs contrary to California H. In the previous line of
cases, the Court examined whether the law calls for the measurement of
a coastal state's coastline to include extensions caused by non-natural
structures. Instead of looking at the legal change a non-natural structure
causes to the measurement of a states coastline, the Court considered
only whether the Army's permitting process satisfied administrative
requirements. Such an approach ignores whether the Corps can change
the law as established by the SLA and judicial precedent. This error
flaws the Court's analysis because it disregards the true issue of whether
the law calls for a pier to affect the coastline. The Court lost sight of the
core issue of the case when it based its analysis upon which party had the
most rights to a band of submerged land three miles out to sea. That
consideration became the final justification for the decision to elude the
California II holding and the core issue presented. The court concluded:
Were we to accept Alaska's position, the Federal Government's
interests in submerged lands outside the State's zone of control
would conceivably become hostage to state plans to add artificial
additions to its coastline. And if Alaska's reading of the appli-
cable law were followed to its logical extreme, the United States
would be powerless to protect its interests in submerged lands
if a State were to build an artificial addition to the coastline for
the sole purpose of gaining sovereignty over submerged lands
within the United States' zone, so long as the project did not
affect navigability or cause pollution."
The Court's justification of its reasoning misses the mark. It is
based upon the assumption that the issue of the case was only control of
valuable property rights instead of whether United States domestic
boundaries should follow international convention and include the length
of a pier in the measurement of ocean boundaries. As this rule will
apply to all offshore areas, and some areas do not contain valuable
resources, the Court wrongly considered interests in offshore resources
as a part of its decision. Under international law, the United States loses
159. United States v. Alaska, 112 S. Ct. at 1613-1616.
160. Id. at 1616.
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nothing if the state boundary is extended in relation to non-natural
structures, but gains territory if it is not extended. The Court claims that
to extend Alaska's coastline would be to hold the United States hostage,
but this substantially overstates the reality of the situation presented in
United States v. Alaska. The converse is true; the conditional permit
holds the state hostage while giving additional territory to the federal
government.
a. Paramount Powers
The SLA reserves to the federal government "all its navigational
servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands
and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce,
navigation, national defense, and international affairs."' 6 But the Corps'
requirement that a state waive its statutory rights because of the impact
of a coastal project on the location of a state's seaward boundary does
not further any of these paramount powers. That a state's seaward
boundary is changed by an artificial modification of the coastline in no
way leads to any infringement, interference, diminishment or prohibition
of any of the federal government's reserved, paramount powers.
The location of a state's invisible seaward boundary neither obstructs
navigation nor interferes with interstate or foreign commerce. Causing
a delay in the construction of a port, however, would interfere with the
furtherance of interstate and foreign commerce. No real-world problem
burdening modern shipping and navigation can be seen to arise due to the
placement of a state's invisible seaward boundary a few hundred feet in
one direction or another. The location of a state's seaward boundary has
no relation to national security or defense. "This ownership in [a state]
would not interfere in any way with the needs or rights of the United
States in war or peace. The power of the United States is plenary over
these undersea lands precisely as it is over every river, farm, mine, and
factory of the Nation."' 62 Nor could the shifting of a state's seaward
boundary a few hundred feet possibly interfere with international affairs.
Indeed, on the outer continental shelf, the United States possesses full
jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition to the exclusion of any
foreign power.'63
161. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1988).
162. California 1, 332 U.S. at 42-43 (1947) (Reed, J. dissenting).
163. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988).
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b. The Army Corps of Engineers' Authority
The Rivers and Harbors Act"6 provides the Corps' permitting
authority in the nation's navigable waters. Congressional authority to
enact the Act stems from Congressional jurisdiction over navigation
through "the provisions of interstate commerce, or within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction.' Congress passed the RIIA to assure that
the Nation's navigable waters would be free and clear of obstructions to
navigation, in order to increase and enhance interstate and foreign
commerce. The principal purpose of the Act is to assure that construc-
tion projects do not impede navigation." As the Court has stated:
Under section 10 of the River and Harbor Act ... the Corps has
traditionally protected navigation by regulating the building of
structures (piers, docks, etc.) within navigable waters as well as
dredge and ffil activities in such waters.... Starting in 1968, the
Army Corps began to use its authority under the River and
Harbor Act to regulate activities within navigable waters which,
while not necessarily obstructing navigation, would cause
pollution. 67
Nowhere does the Act imply that property rights to submerged lands or
the location of the federal/state boundary are issues to be considered as
a part of the permit process.
164. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1988).
165. United States v. Banister Realty Co., 155 E 583, 595 (1907).
166. See, e.g. Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201 (1967);
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929); Dow Chemical Co. v. Dixie Carriers, Inc.,
330 ESupp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1971), af'd, 463 E2d 120 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1040 (1972); U.S. v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 458 ESupp. 1086, 1091 (W.D.
Pa. 1978), vacated on other grounds 607 E2d 624 (3d Cir. 1979); Minnehaha Creek
Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 449 E Supp. 876 (1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 E2d 617 (1979); United States v.
Sexton Cover Estates, Inc., 526 E2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976) ("Promoting and protecting
navigation was the dominant theme of this chapter..."); United States v. Logan & Craig
Charter Service, Inc., 676 E2d 1216, 1217 (8th Cir. 1982) (Section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act "was enacted to prevent private parties from obstructing navigable
waters...").
167. United States v. Cumberland Farms of Connecticut, Inc., 826 E2d 1151,
1158 (1st Cir. 1987).
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The foundation of the Court's decision in United States v. Alaska is
its broad reading of section 10 of the RHA. Such a reading of this Act
allowed the Court's final conclusion that the Corps may consider
property rights to submerged lands and the location of the federal/state
boundary before granting a permit. The Court first read the "broad"
language of the statute to "flatly prohibit[] the creation of any obstruction
'to navigable capacity that Congress itself has not authorized and it bans
construction of any structure in any water of the United States except on
plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the
Secretary."" 68  It next examined how section 10 has been interpreted
through the years, concluding that although the statute was originally
interpreted relatively narrowly, it is now construed in such a manner to
afford the Corps a great deal of discretion.169 This established the
foundation for the conclusion that the governing regulatory language
found in 33 C.RR. section 320.4 is not an overly broad interpretation
of the powers delegated to the Corps in section 10 of the RHA.
The regulatory language requires the Corps to consider the effect on
the limits of the territorial sea as a part of the permitting process. The
Court's broad interpretation of the language found in the RHA allows it
to uphold this provision even though there is no statutory requirement for
such considerations in the permitting process. The Court's decision to
interpret the language broadly allows it to ignore the Act's silence on this
issue and grant the Corps complete discretion. The grant of discretion
to the Corps forms the cornerstone of the Court's argument in favor of
the federal government.
However, fundamental principles of administrative law suggest that
the Court should not have found that the Act granted the Corps such
complete discretion. The Administrative Procedure Act 70 and case law
require that agency action be consistent with underlying authorities. In
ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, for example, the Court found that a
federal agency "is not permitted to administer the Act in a manner that
is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress enacted
into law," and set aside the Secretary of the Interior's actions, finding
168. United States v. Alaska, 112 S. Ct. at 1612 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988)).
169. Id. at 1613 ("The Committee emphasized that the Corps should instruct its
district engineers ... to increase their emphasis on how the work will affect all aspects
of the public interest, including not only navigation but also conservation of natural
resources, fish and wildlife, air and water quality, esthetics, scenic view, historic sites,
ecology, and other public interest aspects of the waterway.") Id.
170. 5 U.S.C.A §§ 553(b)(2), 706(2)(C) (West 1977).
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them beyond his statutory authority."' The Corps is subject to this same
rule."T Accordingly, the Corps' regulations should be limited to those
considerations found in the enabling legislation. Consideration of
requests for permits should be limited to the stated purposes and policies
of the RHA. Under the Act, those purposes and policies relate to
navigation and pollution, not property rights.
The Court's conclusion in United States v. Alaska palliates the
Corps' usurpation of authority reserved to the Congress. No statute
includes consideration of the effect on property rights to submerged lands
in the territorial sea or the federal/state boundary as necessary to deter-
mining whether a party may build a structure in the navigable waters.
In accordance with the RHA, the Clean Water Act, and the Ocean
Dumping Act, the Corps may deny a permit for the construction of a
harbor facility if it is determined that the construction or facility would
result in an obstruction to navigation, endanger human health or welfare,
the marine environment, or economic potential. None of these statutes,
however, grant the Corps authority to deny such a permit because of the
effect that a construction project may have on the location of a state's
seaward three-mile boundary. Taken together, these three statutes
embody Congress's clear intention of maintaining the Nation's waterways
free from obstruction, and doing so in a manner that does not unreason-
ably diminish the quality of the navigable waters, endanger human
health, safety or welfare, or harm the coastal or marine environment.
Neither jointly nor separately do these three statutes delegate the author-
ity to the Corps to deny or condition a permit for a coastal project
because of the effect such a project may have on the location of a state's
seaward boundary. The RHA never included consideration of property
rights in submerged lands, and, therefore, neither should the Corps'
regulations.
2. State Title and Ownership under the Submerged Lands Act and
the "Public Interest"
It is hereby determined and declared to be in the public interest
that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable
waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the
171. EISI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 517 (1988).
172. See, e.g., Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v. United States, 549 E2d
1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 820 (1978).
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natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right
and power to manage, administer, lease, develop and use the
said lands and natural resources all in accordance with applica-
ble State law be, and they are hereby ... recognized, confirmed
established, and vested in ... the respective States.1 3
Congress so "determined and declared" in 1953 when it passed the SLA.
The United States v. Alaska decision, however, allows the Corps to
consider whether state title and ownership of the submerged lands out to
three miles from its coastline, as modified by any natural or artificial
causes, is in the "public interest." In accordance with these regulations,
the Secretary conducts a "public interest review" of the project before
issuing a permit for the placement of dredge or fill material into the
navigable waters of the United States.74 One of the factors of this
"public interest review" is "whether the coast line or base line might be
altered."'" As Congress has determined and declared that title to the
submerged lands found in the territorial sea vesting in the states is in the
"public interest," the Court should not rule so as to allow the Corps to
reconsider this policy.
The Court considered the public interest review as further support
for its broad reading of section 10 of the RHA. The public interest
review, however, should have favored Alaska when one considers the
totality of the circumstances. The Court implies that there is a general
public interest in the resources of the submerged lands. However,
vesting title to these areas to the states is equally in the public interest.
Also, it is in the public interest to have one "baseline" for measuring
maritime jurisdictional boundaries. This decision creates jurisdictional
ambiguity between the federal government and Alaska. Another factor
that should be considered in the public interest review is that this
decision grants the federal government something for nothing. The
federal governments enjoys an extension of its seaward boundary into
previously international waters while at the same time requiring the state
to waive its right to the counterbalancing windfall. The state is responsi-
ble for the extension and, therefore, it should be entitled to the benefit
under a fair review of the public interest. Weighing the competing
173. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988).
174. See Corps of Engineers, Dept. of the Army, General Regulatory Policies, 33
C.FR. § 320.4(a) (1993).
175. Id. § 320.4(0.
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public interest tips the scales in the favor of Alaska, and against the
Court's decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should have found in United States v. Alaska
that the Corps lacks authority to withhold a permit for the construction
of a coastal project until the state has waived its statutory rights under
the SLA. The three statutes upon which the Army Corps based its
authority to impose such a condition: the 1899 Rivers and Harbors
Appropriations Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act, do not provide the basis to deny a permit
based on a coastal project's effect on the location of a state's seaward
boundary.
Congress set forth an orderly process for determining the boundary
between a state's submerged lands and federal outer continental shelf in
the SLA. Congress recognized that disputes may arise between the states
and the federal government "as to whether or not lands are" state-owned
submerged lands, or federally-managed, outer continental shelf lands.176
To resolve such disputes, Congress included within the SLA a specific
provision delegating to the Secretary of the Interior the authority to
negotiate a remedy for such disputes with the states."7  Since only
Congress has the power to establish state boundaries,17 the Corps'
actions held no independent validity, and unlawfully infringed upon this
congressional delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Interior.
Although the Congress expressly reserved certain paramount federal
powers associated with commerce, navigation, national defense and
international affairs,179 the requirement that a state waive its statutory
rights under the SLA has no rational relationship to the exercise of any
of these powers. The Court needed to look no further than the SLA to
determine the impropriety of the Corps' actions.
The Corps overstepped its authority by declining to approve the City
of Nome's causeway construction permit until Alaska waived its rights
to submerged lands granted by the SLA. The Supreme Court has held
that natural shifts in the coastline and artificial coastline construction,
176. See 43 U.S.C. § 1336 (1988).
177. Id.
178. Louisiana H, 363 U.S. at 35.
179. See 43 U.S.C. § 1314 (1988).
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such as the Nome causeway, alter the coastal boundaries for purposes of
the SLA. To allow the Corps discretion to condition construction
permits based upon the effect on the federal/state boundary disregards the
clear intended purpose of the act and violates the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. The Army Corps of Engineers has no right to change the law.
In light of the decision in United States v. Alaska one must conclude that
federal interests indeed prevail in the territorial sea.
